Humanitarian Aid, NGOs, and the United States
The Carnegie Council recently released testimony from a November 27, 2001 meeting of the International Council on Human Rights Policy held in New York City, in an article written by Joe Saunders for the group’s website and newsletter. Based in Geneva, this panel of international scholars and field experts has been presenting policy recommendations to the world community for the greater part of three decades. At this particular workshop, the participants (who remain anonymous due to government and NGO affiliations) were faced with four specific questions relating to humanitarian intervention in the post-September 11th world. These questions included: 1) Who is claiming the human rights mantle and for what purpose? 2) Should human rights NGOs ever advocate armed intervention in human rights crises? 3) Has September 11th adversely affected relations between international and local rights NGOs? 4) What is the proper role of international NGOs in shaping post-conflict institutions? I think that these are very important questions to ask, though I believe that this particular committee met at a time when it was impossible to comprehensively address these issues. If the committee were to meet again, it could prove to be a valuable exercise for the international aid community.
Question 1 – Who is claiming the human rights mantle and for what purpose?
Without blinking, the obvious answer here is America. We have only to look at the language used by President Bush and his top aides at the beginning of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq and compare it to that which we are hearing now. Humanitarian intervention only became a top priority in Afghanistan after the Taliban was displaced and pictures of thousands of impoverished and suppressed women came streaming over the twenty-four hour news networks on a daily basis. Furthermore, it is obvious that humanitarian aid came to the forefront in Iraq only after our armed forces completed a thorough yet futile search for weapons of mass destruction. I believe that, according to their testimony, most of the members of this special commission would agree with these assessments.
“In the early days and weeks of U.S. bombing, there were major concerns that war against the Taliban/al Qaeda would produce a humanitarian disaster in the region as winter approached,” said Saunders, “such concerns were dismissed as secondary to the objective of rooting out al Qaeda before it could wreak more havoc.”
I agree with participants quoted later in the article that point out President Bush’s use of human rights language in post-September 11th speech. The individual pointed out that he continuously described the war on terrorism as a war against an enemy that hated our morals and ideals, an enemy that wanted to suppress freedom. I think that it is somewhat interesting that instead of simply characterizing them as the ones who perpetrated such a heinous act on American soil, he and others within his administration, related the conflict more to a fight for the rights to continue the American way of life.
Question 2 – Should human rights NGOs ever advocate armed intervention in human rights crises?
This is a very controversial question as you have two distinct camps, those that suggest neutrality like the International Red Cross, and those who take a decidedly hard-line approach against oppressive or invasive sects. An organization like Doctors Without Borders would fit into the latter category. It is suggested by the participants cited within the article that if an NGO is on the ground it has the right to remain neutral. Sometimes taking a position can greatly compromise a group’s ability to provide aid, and if humanitarian assistance is the goal than it can often be better not to isolate yourself within a particular context. According to the commission, however, “NGOs that are not involved in such on-the-ground decision-making have both the capacity and moral obligation to be vocal.”
On the other hand, taking sides can prove to be quite difficult even for these outside organizations. As Saunders suggests, “If an NGO endorses armed intervention, it will become more difficult for the organization to claim to be an impartial judge of any alleged human rights abuses that follow.”
Credibility is often the only currency that some of these human rights NGOs carry in international conflict areas. For this reason, I believe that human rights organizations that do not have a significant interest in personnel on the ground, do have a duty to speak up and report their findings be they one-sided or not. However, for the safety and maintenance of the group, the NGO should never publicly advocate or call for military intervention unless it is a uniformed coalition approved by the United Nations.
Question 3 – Has September 11th adversely affected relations between international and local rights NGOs?
“Even members of rights groups in developing countries who think the American response (in Afghanistan and/or Iraq) is correct and justifiable are uncomfortable because they know that only the United States is capable of this type of response,” suggested one panel member. “No other states have the resources necessary to exercise this option.”
I think that this passage generally sums up the answer. The international community of aid-workers and human rights NGOs is involved in a power struggle, whether or not by choice, because the United States and its so-called coalition of the willing has imposed their will in conflict areas without the blessing of credible international bodies. If the United States is the dominant world power, than it must also be the dominant humanitarian resource. Smaller, more local groups then must be intimidated if not subjected to the will of the world’s most prominent government actors. As one panelist says, “There is no international due process, and little voice for those outside the U.S. in key decisions affecting the global community.”
Essentially, I believe, the same thing is happening between powerful and small NGOs as between powerful and smaller nations in the post 9/11 world. The United States could not secure the agreement of some large nations and many smaller, less powerful ones and so had to create its coalition. I agree with another panelist that suggests, “The distinction between ‘local’ and ‘international’ NGOs, for instance, might be simply a euphemism for weak NGOs and powerful NGOs, respectively…When powerful international NGOs fail to criticize U.S. policies sufficiently forcefully (or fail to communicate their criticisms effectively to an international audience), they risk losing support among smaller organizations worldwide.”
Question 4 – What is the role of international NGOs in shaping post-conflict institutions?
I think that we learned a valuable lesson after the former Soviet Union withdrew itself from Afghanistan in the early ‘90’s. Without sufficient NGO support on the ground there was no voice in the international community that would have seen the increasingly disturbing oppression and radicalism that was spreading with the new Taliban regime. If powerful international NGOs had been working there from the onset, there’s a good chance that the political environment may not have had the freedom and seclusion to deteriorate as it did. For this reason, the UN, the “coalition of the willing”, or any future interventionist body needs to incorporate NGOs into the post-conflict process of reconstruction, as both an aid-delivery and monitoring body. As it is suggested within the article, “the development of post conflict institutions to deal with the legacies of violence and develop a new, stable order are necessary parts of the intervention.”
Question 1 – Who is claiming the human rights mantle and for what purpose?
Without blinking, the obvious answer here is America. We have only to look at the language used by President Bush and his top aides at the beginning of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq and compare it to that which we are hearing now. Humanitarian intervention only became a top priority in Afghanistan after the Taliban was displaced and pictures of thousands of impoverished and suppressed women came streaming over the twenty-four hour news networks on a daily basis. Furthermore, it is obvious that humanitarian aid came to the forefront in Iraq only after our armed forces completed a thorough yet futile search for weapons of mass destruction. I believe that, according to their testimony, most of the members of this special commission would agree with these assessments.
“In the early days and weeks of U.S. bombing, there were major concerns that war against the Taliban/al Qaeda would produce a humanitarian disaster in the region as winter approached,” said Saunders, “such concerns were dismissed as secondary to the objective of rooting out al Qaeda before it could wreak more havoc.”
I agree with participants quoted later in the article that point out President Bush’s use of human rights language in post-September 11th speech. The individual pointed out that he continuously described the war on terrorism as a war against an enemy that hated our morals and ideals, an enemy that wanted to suppress freedom. I think that it is somewhat interesting that instead of simply characterizing them as the ones who perpetrated such a heinous act on American soil, he and others within his administration, related the conflict more to a fight for the rights to continue the American way of life.
Question 2 – Should human rights NGOs ever advocate armed intervention in human rights crises?
This is a very controversial question as you have two distinct camps, those that suggest neutrality like the International Red Cross, and those who take a decidedly hard-line approach against oppressive or invasive sects. An organization like Doctors Without Borders would fit into the latter category. It is suggested by the participants cited within the article that if an NGO is on the ground it has the right to remain neutral. Sometimes taking a position can greatly compromise a group’s ability to provide aid, and if humanitarian assistance is the goal than it can often be better not to isolate yourself within a particular context. According to the commission, however, “NGOs that are not involved in such on-the-ground decision-making have both the capacity and moral obligation to be vocal.”
On the other hand, taking sides can prove to be quite difficult even for these outside organizations. As Saunders suggests, “If an NGO endorses armed intervention, it will become more difficult for the organization to claim to be an impartial judge of any alleged human rights abuses that follow.”
Credibility is often the only currency that some of these human rights NGOs carry in international conflict areas. For this reason, I believe that human rights organizations that do not have a significant interest in personnel on the ground, do have a duty to speak up and report their findings be they one-sided or not. However, for the safety and maintenance of the group, the NGO should never publicly advocate or call for military intervention unless it is a uniformed coalition approved by the United Nations.
Question 3 – Has September 11th adversely affected relations between international and local rights NGOs?
“Even members of rights groups in developing countries who think the American response (in Afghanistan and/or Iraq) is correct and justifiable are uncomfortable because they know that only the United States is capable of this type of response,” suggested one panel member. “No other states have the resources necessary to exercise this option.”
I think that this passage generally sums up the answer. The international community of aid-workers and human rights NGOs is involved in a power struggle, whether or not by choice, because the United States and its so-called coalition of the willing has imposed their will in conflict areas without the blessing of credible international bodies. If the United States is the dominant world power, than it must also be the dominant humanitarian resource. Smaller, more local groups then must be intimidated if not subjected to the will of the world’s most prominent government actors. As one panelist says, “There is no international due process, and little voice for those outside the U.S. in key decisions affecting the global community.”
Essentially, I believe, the same thing is happening between powerful and small NGOs as between powerful and smaller nations in the post 9/11 world. The United States could not secure the agreement of some large nations and many smaller, less powerful ones and so had to create its coalition. I agree with another panelist that suggests, “The distinction between ‘local’ and ‘international’ NGOs, for instance, might be simply a euphemism for weak NGOs and powerful NGOs, respectively…When powerful international NGOs fail to criticize U.S. policies sufficiently forcefully (or fail to communicate their criticisms effectively to an international audience), they risk losing support among smaller organizations worldwide.”
Question 4 – What is the role of international NGOs in shaping post-conflict institutions?
I think that we learned a valuable lesson after the former Soviet Union withdrew itself from Afghanistan in the early ‘90’s. Without sufficient NGO support on the ground there was no voice in the international community that would have seen the increasingly disturbing oppression and radicalism that was spreading with the new Taliban regime. If powerful international NGOs had been working there from the onset, there’s a good chance that the political environment may not have had the freedom and seclusion to deteriorate as it did. For this reason, the UN, the “coalition of the willing”, or any future interventionist body needs to incorporate NGOs into the post-conflict process of reconstruction, as both an aid-delivery and monitoring body. As it is suggested within the article, “the development of post conflict institutions to deal with the legacies of violence and develop a new, stable order are necessary parts of the intervention.”
posted by M. Rybacki at 6:53 PM
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